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SO: This is Sue Onslow talking to Chief Emeka Anyaoku on Wednesday, 1st 
May 2013 at Senate House. Chief Emeka, thank you very much indeed 
for coming here to talk to me about the Commonwealth Secretariat from 
when you joined in 1966 through your time as Secretary General of the 
Commonwealth. 
 
When you were first approached while you were in your position at the 
United Nations in New York in 1966, what was your understanding of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat and the role of Secretary General? 
 
EA: Well, I was actually first approached in December ‘65. My government told 
me that month that I was to be seconded to the newly established 
Commonwealth Secretariat. My first reaction was to say ‘No’, I was not 
prepared to go there because in my view at the time the Commonwealth was 
a neo colonialist organisation; it had not found a niche for itself; and I wasn’t 
sure what the Secretariat would be about until I had a discussion with A L 
Adu, the Deputy Secretary General whom Arnold Smith asked to come to 
New York to see me. 
 
I talked with him and from what he said I formed the favourable impression 
that Arnold Smith was a man who was determined to make something of the 
Commonwealth. So, I agreed and came to London in April 1966. My view of 
Arnold Smith at the time was that he was determined to make the Secretariat 
an instrument for Commonwealth diplomacy. In that respect, I'm not too 
comfortable with the description of the Commonwealth Secretary General as 
an international civil servant. Arnold Smith laid the foundation of the Secretary 
General becoming more than a Civil Servant. A civil servant is usually an 
adviser who advises on policy formation and sees to the carrying out of 
policies. But Arnold Smith was an international public servant in the sense 
that he believed that the Secretary General should have a role in the 
formulation of Commonwealth policies, and this was what he did. 
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SO: That was very evident from looking at his role in the committee to set up 
the Secretariat, dated from ’64 to ’65. I've seen his papers in the Canada 
Archives, and they show clearly his dynamism and the proactive 
approach which he genuinely believed the new Secretary General 
should occupy. It seems to me he came into office, very much with a 
goal, a strategy and a purpose to this new role and he was determined 
to give it substance and formulation. 
 
EA: Absolutely, because there were two schools of thought about the Secretariat. 
One school which was typified by the New Zealand Prime Minister, Robert 
Muldoon, was that the Secretariat would be like a Cabinet office and the 
Secretary General should be like a Cabinet Secretary taking notes in the 
cabinet meetings and doing no more than that. The other school was the 
Arnold Smith school that believed that the Secretariat had a role to play in 
shaping the new, the modern Commonwealth and so he stuck to that role. 
The first and most important Commonwealth declaration was the Singapore 
Declaration of 1971 which I would describe as a statement of shared 
Commonwealth beliefs. The difference between that and the subsequent 
Harare Declaration of 1991 was that whereas the Singapore Declaration was 
a statement of shared beliefs, the Harare Declaration was a statement of a 
code of conduct. ‘Shared beliefs’ are there for people to proclaim; a code of 
conduct is there for people to adhere to. 
 
SO: When you first joined the Secretariat in 1966, in the International Affairs 
Division under its director, Tom Aston, it was a very much smaller 
organisation. This was still very much an era, between ’65 and ’71, of 
laying the foundations and growing the Secretariat. Patsy Robertson 
has told me that the joke was that every time Arnold Smith went off to a 
meeting, he came back with a new division. 
 
EA: The Secretariat was established in ’65 as a small organisation. When I joined 
in ’66, the first assignment given to me by Arnold Smith was to be secretary of 
a review committee and this was a committee headed by Lord Sherfield. The 
task of the committee was to look at all the existing Commonwealth 
organisations and see which ones of them could be integrated into the newly 
established Secretariat. The review committee sat for a couple of months and 
as a result of the work of the review committee, the Economic Affairs Division 
of the Secretariat was created, the Education Division of the Secretariat was 
created and the Science Division of the Secretariat was created because 
these had existed as separate individual organisations which were now 
integrated into the new Commonwealth Secretariat. 
 
SO: The Economics Division had existed, of course, beforehand, and had 
been staffed entirely by British civil servants. 
 
EA: That's right. 
 
SO: So, at what point did Arnold Smith start to make a conscious drive to 
recruit commonwealth expertise? 
 
EA: He began to recruit economic experts after the work of the review committee 
resulted in the integration of what had existed as a Commonwealth Economic 
Council as the Economic Affairs Division of the Secretariat. 
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SO: These also, of course, are the years of considerable political challenges 
for the new Secretariat with the Rhodesian UDI crisis and the 
consequent enormous tensions that caused within the Commonwealth, 
the organisation of the heads of government meeting, the emerging 
Nigerian civil war, tensions over St Kitts, Nevis and Anguilla, the 
Gibraltar referendum. These were, as I say, times of challenges for the 
International Affairs Division. Were you concurrently involved, in your 
work, with these various challenges, or was Arnold Smith quite careful 
to make sure that he allocated different roles to different officers? I'm 
trying to follow his working practices and management of this new 
international organisation. 
 
EA: Arnold Smith believed in using his colleagues for what tasks he considered 
that they could perform well. For the Anguilla crisis, he appointed me 
Secretary of the Anguilla Commission, a nine months operation that was 
headed by Sir Hugh Wooding, former Chief Justice of Trinidad and Tobago. 
For the Gibraltar referendum I was also the secretary of the Commonwealth 
team that went to Gibraltar. 
 
Arnold Smith believed in the Secretariat helping its member countries to deal 
with political and diplomatic challenges. So, when in the Anguilla crisis which 
had resulted from the decision of the leaders of the island of Anguilla to 
secede from the three island state of St Kitts, Nevis and Anguilla, Arnold 
Smith in discussions with Lord Home then British Foreign Secretary, offered 
the help of a Commonwealth commission in dealing with the crisis and Lord 
Home accepted. Consequently, Arnold Smith constituted a Commonwealth 
team to go and deal with the crisis and asked me to be the Secretary of the 
team. A similar thing happened over Gibraltar. For many years, several 
Commonwealth countries at the United Nations had, in their opposition to 
colonialism, voted with Spain in resolutions that sought to invalidate the 
Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 which ceded Gibraltar to the United Kingdom. 
Arnold Smith after a discussion with Prime Minister Harold Wilson decided to 
appoint a Commonwealth team of observers to assist in ascertaining in a 
referendum what the wishes of the Gibraltarians were. 
 
SO: So, this was Arnold Smith’s initiative, proposing it to the British 
government? 
 
EA: Well, having not been present at the discussion, I cannot say whose idea the 
referendum was. All I know is that when Arnold Smith came back from 
Downing Street, he called me and said that he was going to constitute a team 
of observers from the Commonwealth and wanted me to be the Secretary of 
the team. The team went to Gibraltar a few times; I still remember that at the 
referendum there were 144 votes for joining Spain, and 12,138 for staying 
British. 
 
SO: Rather like the recent vote in the Falklands referendum? 
 
EA: I believe so. At the following Commonwealth heads of government meeting 
after the referendum, I remember Harold Wilson saying to his colleagues, 
“For years your representatives at the UN have been voting that the UK 
should hand over Gibraltar to Spain. Look at the results of the referendum, 
what do the figures say?” Whereupon, Julius Nyerere replied, “Well, Harold, 
in that case we'll change our votes”. 
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SO: The people have spoken! I have three questions coming out of what 
you've just said. In those early years what was the relationship like 
between the Secretary General and Downing Street? I've read elsewhere 
that at critical points there had been frictions and tensions between 
Marlborough House and King Charles Street. But, as you recall, in those 
early years what was the relationship like? 
 
EA: Well, at the level of bureaucrats, the relationship was initially at least not 
excellent because the bureaucrats seemed to prefer to side with the school of 
thought that would limit the role of the Secretariat to just note taking and 
implementing the decisions of Commonwealth leaders. The bureaucrats were 
generally of that ilk even to the extent that the registration of the car of the 
Commonwealth Secretary General had become an issue. When Arnold Smith 
wanted ‘CSG 1’, the officials resisted that, but Arnold Smith had his way in the 
end. 
 
At the political level, it really depended on who the Prime Minister was. Arnold 
Smith got on very well with Harold Wilson, and also very well with James 
Callaghan. The friction really occurred with Ted Heath. When Ted Heath 
became Prime Minister and made it clear that he was going to honour the 
Simonstown Agreement which meant arms to apartheid South Africa, that 
was the beginning of the friction between Downing Street and Marlborough 
House. 
 
SO: You are identifying here friction between political cultures, but also 
between bureaucratic cultures?  
 
EA: Yes. 
 
SO: And of the challenge to British civil servants dealing with and of having 
to recognise a new diplomatic actor... 
 
EA: Absolutely. 
 
SO: …which had a legitimate voice - and I use that word “legitimate” very 
carefully.  
 
EA: Yes. 
 
SO: Having looked at some of the papers of the Commonwealth, I'm very 
alive to Harold Wilson’s use of the Commonwealth to support British 
diplomacy – such as in an idea of a mediation team going to Vietnam; in 
the idea, as you say, of the Gibraltar referendum. When you make 
reference to the commission in Anguilla, it was followed subsequently 
(under a Conservative Government) by the Pearce Commission, another 
commission to solicit grass roots support for a particular settlement 
proposal. 
 
EA: Yes but the Commonwealth played no part in the Pearce Commission. 
 
SO: So, there seems to be a cross-fertilisation of ideas here between 
Downing Street and the Commonwealth Secretariat. 
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EA: Yes, I believe this was the case. Arnold Smith convinced the political 
leadership in the UK that the Commonwealth was there to be used by its 
members for dealing with some economic and political challenges and that he 
as the head of the Secretariat was willing to see the Secretariat contribute to 
such undertakings. Obviously it depended on the political leadership and what 
their objective was. Harold Wilson had led the fruitless talks on HMS Tiger 
and HMS Fearless. He did not involve the Secretariat in the two talks. 
 
SO: From what you observed, was the very fact that Arnold Smith was an 
experienced Canadian diplomat important in establishing that separate 
voice of the Commonwealth? 
 
EA: Indeed, it really mattered that Arnold Smith was a Canadian. 
 
SO: And as a white Canadian? 
 
EA: Yes, Canada was a white country without the baggage of colonialism and all 
that. A real and effective bridge between the old and the new Commonwealth. 
 
SO: Patsy’s also described Arnold Smith as being from the Caribbean, as 
his family was from Grenada. So there was a slightly different aspect, 
she said, to his formative political culture. 
 
EA: Well, I would say from my dealings with Arnold Smith which lasted for such a 
long time that we were not just colleagues, but also became friends. I 
remember my last visit to him accompanied by Mary Mackie when he was ill 
in Canada. I had gone to the trouble of going all the way to visit him on his 
sick bed in Canada. One of Arnold Smith’s greatest virtues was that he was 
entirely colour blind. There are not many people, whether black or white, 
whom one describe as being genuinely colour blind. This was one of his 
strengths as Commonwealth Secretary General. 
 
SO: In terms of his management of the Secretariat: it has been said of other 
organisations that different divisions, and different elements receive 
particular attention from the leadership and the others can be left to just 
bumble along in their own particular way. What was Arnold Smith’s way 
of working? Was this to foster a dynamic, evolutionary approach to the 
Secretariat and its emerging divisions? How did he support his 
particular officers? 
 
EA: Well, Arnold Smith believed in dialogue and he had regular discussions with 
the heads of the divisions, the directors. At that time there weren’t too many 
directors. He was naturally inclined to dealing more often with the directors 
and their assistants of divisions that happened to be working in the areas of 
his immediate concern and immediate priority. He worked a great deal with 
the International Affairs Division because the crises that were at the time 
capable of making or un-making the Commonwealth were essentially political 
crises. So, Arnold Smith focused very much on the political challenges that 
the Commonwealth faced at that stage. This is not to suggest that he 
overlooked the Economic, Education and Science sides of the house. 
 
SO: And they were significant. 
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EA: Yes, the crises were significant because they were capable of breaking up the 
Commonwealth. Rhodesia, as it then was, was a major challenge to the 
continued cohesion of the Commonwealth, and Arnold Smith handled it. You 
will find this in his own memoirs. 
 
SO: Yes, in ‘Stitches in Time’. 
 
EA: He was involved in seeking to end colonialism in Southern Africa. I 
accompanied him to a meeting with the then Portuguese Foreign Minister. 
 
SO: Mario Soares? 
 
EA: Yes, Mario Soares. He met Mario Soares more than two times. He first met 
him on Saba Saba Day - that's July 7th – in 1974 in Dar es Salaam and then 
again here in London. Mario Soares was staying at a hotel in Knightsbridge 
and they talked about Mozambique. I remember that the first meeting on 
Saba Saba Day was somewhat overshadowed by the forceful interpretation of 
the speech made by Nyerere into Swahili by Samora Machel the leader of the 
Liberation Movement in Mozambique, FRELIMO. 
 
SO: Because this contact between Portugal, post the April ‘Carnation 
Revolution’, with the Secretariat in the run-up to Mozambique’s own first 
step to full independence the following year in ’75 is not widely known. 
So, how close were these contacts? Were they discussing 
developmental assistance, support to FRELIMO as a liberation 
movement moving to a new government? 
 
EA: Arnold Smith was at that stage urging Mario Soares to persuade the 
Portuguese revolutionary government to accept the inevitability of the 
independence of its African territories. 
 
SO: But in July/August General Spinola was still arguing over a different 
proposal for colonial autonomy...  
 
EA: Mario Soares had personally accepted decolonisation. He was ahead of 
Spinola who did not seem prepared to grant full independence to their African 
colonies. Mario Soares had seen that the end of Portuguese control of 
Mozambique was inevitable and in his discussion with Arnold Smith was 
interested in how the Commonwealth experience would be useful to the 
Portugese speaking countries in Southern Africa. Arnold Smith also met with 
Samora Machel who briefed him on FRELIMO’s continuing struggle for the 
independence of Mozambique. 
 
SO: Sir, are you aware whether Arnold Smith, in any way, sought to 
encourage Samora Machel to keep white skills in the country? Part of 
Mozambique’s challenge post-independence was to deal with the abrupt 
departure of Portuguese settlers, but also their physical destruction of 
infrastructure, and of industry? 
 
EA: Well, you see, there were two schools of thought in Portugal. One school was 
in support of what you would call a ‘scorched-earth policy’, that is totally 
abandoning Mozambique to its fate as the French had done in Guinea. In 
being compelled to grant independence to Guinea, the French had gone as 
far as letting prisoners free from the prisons. 
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 The other school of thought to which Mario Soares clearly belonged was “let's 
give them independence, but let's retain relations with them so that we can 
work with them”. It was this second school of thought that won the argument 
because Portugal granted independence to Mozambique in two stages. First, 
there was the provisional self-government which was headed by Joaquim 
Chissano for almost a year while Samora Machel remained in the bush still 
leading FRELIMO. It was after about nine months when full Independence 
came that Samora Machel, with his troops, marched into Maputo. 
 
SO: So, Arnold Smith’s ideas were to offer training, and human skill 
development? Did you, as a more junior officer in the Secretariat, have 
to follow up on any of these exploratory offers? 
 
EA: Arnold Smith laid the foundation; but the formal offer to Mozambique of 
Commonwealth assistance in the development of human skills was made by 
Sonny Ramphal. On becoming Secretary General in July 1975, Sonny 
Ramphal asked me to lead a team of three secretariat officials - John Sisson, 
Roland Brown and myself – to Mozambique to explore the possibility of 
Commonwealth assistance to the emerging nation. At that time it was 
Joaquim Chissano’s transitional government which was in power. We went 
and discussed with the transitional government the possibility of 
Commonwealth training of Mozambicans as they prepared to assume full 
responsibility for their government. It was on the basis of our report that a 
formal Commonwealth Assistance Programme for Mozambique was 
established thereby laying the foundation for an eventual Mozambican close 
relations with the Commonwealth which culminated in the country’s admission 
into the membership of the organisation. 
 
SO: So, this pre-dates Mozambican independence and Rhodesian/ 
Zimbabwe transition in 1979-80. In fact, there were early supportive 
moves from the Commonwealth right from the start of Mozambique’s 
independence? 
 
EA: Yes. 
 
SO: It's interesting to make the comparison of Commonwealth assistance 
offered to Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, and also Commonwealth assistance 
offered to South Africa at the point of transition. 
 
EA: Yes. 
 
SO: So, early templates were developed and then later elaborated? 
 
EA: It was the same idea that had to be developed in accordance with the 
circumstances in the three countries. 
 
SO: Very much so. Just to go back to Singapore in 1971, a Commonwealth 
Heads of Government meeting which at that point lasted ten days. You 
were of critical importance, together with Ivan Head, in drafting the 
Singapore Declaration. Where did the intellectual ideas behind this 
come from? Was there much resistance in the wider heads of 
government to such formulation? 
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R I think it would be fair to give some credit for the intellectual origins of the 
Singapore Declaration to Ivan Head and Pierre Trudeau. The draft was a 
three-cornered effort because of the inputs into it by the Secretariat and the 
State House in Lusaka. At the CHOGM in Singapore, it was really driven 
more by Kaunda than by Trudeau, because it was Kaunda who in the face of 
the crisis over arms supplies to South Africa pushed the idea of defining the 
Commonwealth. He argued that the idea of defining the character of the 
Commonwealth was important because by acknowledging the 
Commonwealth as an association of equal sovereign states, all would be 
accepting the right of individual members to determine and pursue their 
independent policies. While at the same time defining the shared fundamental 
principles of the association would make it easier for member governments to 
recognise and avoid policies that go against those principles. Thus it would be 
easier to deal with the question of apartheid because you cannot believe in 
non-racism and in freedom and democracy, and at the same time be 
supporting an apartheid regime. By agreeing to that and to the decision to set 
up a committee of eight foreign ministers to deal with the crisis, it made it 
possible for Ted Heath to save face. For as they say, when a problem seems 
immediately insoluble, it should be assigned to a Royal commission 
[Laughter]. 
 
SO: Sir, please may I just ask you about President Kaunda’s particular role. 
You've used the word “inter-mestic” in your memoirs, “of domestic 
issues that then have international ramifications and require 
Commonwealth assistance”. Is there also a dynamic of individual 
Commonwealth leaders using success through the Commonwealth to 
feed back into their domestic environment? As that gives them 
additional legitimacy? 
 
EA: Yes. Take elections, for example. Commonwealth observance of elections 
legitimises the election and makes it easier for the parties who have lost to 
accept the result if the election is judged to be free and fair by Commonwealth 
observers. And this works both for the governing and the opposition parties. 
 
Zambia was an example of this. As I told the story in my book, I sent a team 
of Commonwealth observers to Zambia for the elections and had asked Patsy 
Robertson who was their spokesperson to let me know the moment that the 
returns established a decisive trend. By sheer coincidence, Patsy called me 
while I was having lunch alone with Nelson Mandela in the Carlton Hotel in 
Johannesburg. Patsy told me that it had begun to appear from the announced 
returns that the opposition party leader, Frederick Chiluba was going to win, 
but that at the same time, the signals coming from Kaunda’s camp were 
pointing to a rejection of the outcome of the elections. 
 
I immediately called Kaunda and informed him of the brief I had received from 
my people. He told me that his supporters were reporting to him that there 
was a significant manipulation of votes by the opposition party. Whereupon I 
said to him, “KK, my people, the Commonwealth team have told me that their 
verdict was going to be that the election was generally free and fair, it would 
be very difficult for it to be invalidated.” I strongly advised him to agree to 
accept the result. 
 
Mandela was listening to this conversation. I said to him “KK, I believe that 
your brother, Nelson Mandela, who is here with me would like to say hello to 
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you” and then gave the phone to Mandela. He spoke to KK offering him his 
sympathy. 
 
After that I tried to call Chiluba. I didn’t get Chiluba immediately but I got one 
of the leaders of his party, Vernon Mwaanga, an old friend of mine. I said to 
Vernon, “Look, my people tell me that you're winning. Congratulations. But I 
want to talk to Chiluba because I would like to strongly advise him that in 
victory, he should treat KK as a father of the nation and a senior citizen”. 
Vernon agreed and gave me Chiluba’s telephone number. 
 
I called and spoke to Chiluba. After congratulating and advising him on how 
he should treat KK, I told him that KK had assured me that he would accept 
the verdict of the election and would himself personally conduct Chiluba 
around the State House in handing over the government to him. Chiluba told 
me that he accepted my advice. Accordingly on leaving the State House, KK 
was moved to a house belonging to a government para-statal. 
 
However, after about seven to ten days, a group within Chiluba’s party 
succeeded in getting him to change his attitude to KK. Vernon Mwaanga was 
the leader of the group. KK was then thrown out of the house. His personal 
effects were searched and ransacked on the allegation that they were looking 
for books that he had removed from the State House library. And his pension 
was stopped. 
 
I did not know of any of this until some five weeks later when I went to Arusha 
for a roundtable arranged by Salim Salim, then Secretary-General of OAU, on 
democracy. KK attended the roundtable and we were staying at the same 
hotel. KK told me that he would like to see me and I, treating him as an ex-
senior leader, went to his room to see him. He poured his heart out to me, 
telling me of how he arrived in Arusha at 5am by courtesy of a special flight 
arranged by President Moi of Kenya, how he was thrown out of the 
government-owned house in Lusaka, how his two sons had teamed up to find 
accommodation for him, and how his pension payment was stopped. He was 
evidently in need for funds. I thought that it was quite remarkable and much to 
his credit that after 27 years as leader of Zambia he had no savings. 
 
SO: He was a man of integrity; he is a man of integrity.  
 
EA: Of great integrity. I was so moved that on my return to London, I called 
Chiluba and said to him, “I'd like to come and see you”. Chiluba agreed. So, I 
flew down to Lusaka and had a meeting with Chiluba. I asked him, “How 
could you treat KK in the manner that he had narrated to me” I reminded him 
of the conversation we had at the end of the elections. His reply was that the 
pension arrangements approved by KK’s government for the President and 
members of parliament had been excessive and that the government and the 
country could not afford to pay that. I replied, “If you cannot afford that, why 
don't you pay him something in the interim while you decide what you can 
afford?” I reminded him that he himself would one day become an ex-
President and that it would be in the interest of all to have a settled 
government pension arrangements. At the end we agreed that I should 
recommend a package to him and his Government. 
 
 I went to see KK after that and was quite upset by the condition in which I 
found him. The house where he was and the surroundings were relatively 
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poor; his children could not afford anything higher than that. So, I came back 
to London and asked my International Affairs Division to collate the practices 
of about five countries, including developed and developing countries, of how 
they treated their ex-Heads of Government. It was on the basis of that that we 
prepared a package which I recommended to Chiluba. Eventually he and his 
government adopted the package. 
 
SO: Sir, did you use this experience to inform your approach when you were 
using ‘good offices’ in the 1990s - approaching African leaders whom 
you had known personally through the Commonwealth Secretariat, and 
also when you were Foreign Minister of Nigeria, to encourage them to 
accept the need for popular expression of voting preference? 
 
EA: Yes. 
 
SO: I was just wondering how formative experiences played into your 
negotiating skills, persuading people who had been in office in one-
party states, or no-party states, the logic of allowing multi-party 
elections? 
 
EA: Well, you see, it goes back to my determination from the start of my tenure. 
After my election, I spent about six months in retreat before I assumed office 
on the 1st July, 1990. One of my firm decisions was that the Commonwealth 
must deal with its internal contradiction because on the one hand, the 
Commonwealth was rightly championing the cause of non-racism and 
democracy in South Africa, while on the other hand, the same 
Commonwealth was tolerating among its membership military dictatorships 
and one-party states that were clearly non-democratic regimes. 
 
Such a situation provided material for some of the right wing newspapers in 
the UK, in Australia, in Canada and elsewhere to criticise the Commonwealth 
and cast doubt on the usefulness of the association. I was determined to 
change that situation. So, when after the Harare Declaration which prescribed 
a code of conduct for Commonwealth countries, I used that as the basis for 
persuading the Heads of government who were running either one party 
states or military regimes to accept that the Commonwealth principles were 
meant to be kept and lived by. 
 
SO: Sir, with respect, it's one thing for heads of government to accept 
aspirational declarations that could be said to be part of process, and 
then to confront the reality of what that means for their own particular 
position in-country. 
 
EA: That's where personal chemistry, personal relationships and personal 
confidence became important. I mean, in discussions with people with whom 
you have established good relations and mutual self-confidence making them 
believe you and accept what you're saying. There are two examples of this. I 
had long conversations with Kenneth Kaunda whose starting point was to 
have a referendum to decide whether there should be a multi-party state or 
not in Zambia. Eventually I persuaded him to do away with the referendum in 
the same way as I persuaded France-Albert Rene in the Seychelles who was 
going to have a referendum to determine whether his country should move 
from one-party to multi-party government. But I was not able to persuade 
Kamuzu Banda on a similar point in Malawi. Banda had sent his minister to 
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see me and I sent him a message using the same arguments that I had used 
with KK. But Banda insisted on going to a referendum before changed to a 
multi-party state. 
 
SO: Sir, this question of personal chemistry, mutual confidence and 
personal knowledge with African leaders involved that intangible and 
vital question of trust. 
 
EA: Yes. Yes. 
 
SO: Had you developed a particular, lawyerly, technique for opening the 
discussion to show the other side of the argument? You said you 
persuaded them. I'm intrigued to know how? 
 
EA: I believe that when seeking to persuade leaders, the technique I that used 
which worked was to start with an appreciation of their problems and 
challenges. You must appreciate their problems and show that you really 
understand what they're struggling with. Generally, it's coping with opposition 
parties who in a number of cases were deriving some of their oxygen from 
outside elements. 
 
SO: Not necessarily just oxygen! 
 
EA: Well, I mean support. In 1998 I convened a Roundtable of Commonwealth 
leaders in Africa on the theme of sustaining democracy in their countries. I 
discussed with them in a room where they were alone with me - the only other 
person with us was Frene Ginwala the speaker of the South African 
parliament at the time whom I had invited to be the Rapporteur. To my 
question about the main challenges they faced in adopting and sustaining 
democracy in their countries, all of them, to a person, spoke about outside 
interests seeking to undermine them, not only through verbal encouragement 
but also through supply of funds to their opposition parties. In Zimbabwe, for 
example according to President Mugabe, the Heritage Foundation in the 
United States and the Westminster Foundation in London were providing 
encouragement and funds to his opposition party led by Morgan Tsvangirai 
and he claimed that his Government had evidence of bank transfers. 
 
SO: So, this completely counteracted any argument of a loyal opposition? 
 
EA: Yes, that was their contention. And come to think of it, I doubt if there is any 
African lexicon where you have the concept of “a loyal opposition”. The 
common African lexicon is either political friends or political enemies and the 
only natural treatment of enemies is to put them to rout. 
 
SO: Sir, this is fascinating because so much emphasis is placed on political 
cultures coming out of liberation struggles. You have contestation for 
absolute power; winner takes all. But this idea that actually there are 
more complicated, historic political roots – with ‘political’ taken in its 
broadest cultural context. 
 
EA: Yes, because culturally speaking, there is only one thing that you do to your 
enemy. You eliminate them. If you have no culture of loyal opposition and all 
the culture you have is that of political enemies, you would naturally want to 
eliminate them. So, in politics, the idea of winner takes all is much more 
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natural to some societies, whereas in the Commonwealth, the basic culture is 
always to seek Commonwealth consensus. 
 
SO: Sir, could I also put to you though, this question of racism earlier. You 
made reference to this earlier. How far do you feel there was also an 
element for individual African leaders to be more open to your style of 
empathy and negotiation, precisely because you came from Nigeria? Of 
course, Nigeria has a very different political culture to Kenya, or to 
Malawi, but was there a Pan-African ideal subtext in your appeal, rather 
than a perceived external, white admonition? 
 
EA: Yes my origin and nationality was a great help because it was easier for them 
to accept critical observations from me being an African; and of course, I put 
that factor to maximum use. When I said that I would start my discussions 
with them by appreciating their problems, I appreciated their problems from 
an African point of view because I readily understood them. 
 
SO: Also as a Nigerian? Your country has been through its own tumults and 
traumas, and yet you have successfully sustained your patriotic 
commitment to your country. You have been a loyal opponent. So, were 
you able to draw on your own particular experience? 
 
EA: Yes. It helped - the fact that I had strongly disagreed with the dictatorship of 
General Abacha but remained as patriotic a Nigerian as any other was an 
example that I constantly referred to. 
 
SO: Sir, in your staff’s support for your work in ‘good offices’, were you 
actively encouraging them to adopt a certain style of negotiation, a 
certain way of interaction? I'm just wondering to what extent your 
leadership from the top was deliberately structured to ensure that your 
staff supported your individual advocacy to best effect? 
 
EA: Well, it's something that I was always mindful of. An example here was my 
very first meeting with F.W. de Klerk in his cabinet room in Pretoria. The 
meeting was on 1st November 1991. The first time that I told him that I had 
come to discuss with him how the Commonwealth could help the process of 
realising his publicly stated objective of transforming the situation in South 
Africa, his first reaction to me was that the Commonwealth was a very hostile 
organisation to South Africa by consistently advocating sports and trade 
sanctions against South Africa; accordingly he did not need help from the 
Commonwealth; that South Africa had friends in Europe, Africa and 
elsewhere. 
 
SO: Very much the mindset from the National Party. 
 
EA: Yes. He said to me, “You know, we have friends in Europe and Africa; we 
don't need the Commonwealth”. And I said to him, “Mr State President, I 
thank you for the candour with which you have spoken to me; I owe it to you 
to reply equally candidly”. I believe that your greatest challenge is how to 
create confidence among your different ethnic racial groups in South Africa. 
Look at my team here”. I had with me, Moni Malhoutra, an Indian; Stuart 
Mole, a Brit; and Moses Anafu, a Ghanaian. I went on to say to him, “You 
know, Mr State President, the Commonwealth can therefore relate to every 
section of your population, and what I have come to offer you is help in 
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building confidence among the different sections of your population.” To give 
State President de Klerk his due, he immediately took the point. So at the end 
of our meeting, he invited me to join him in meeting the press. The press 
conference took place in the atrium of the Union Building. Our second joint 
press conference was in the morning of November 18, 1993 following the 
agreement by all the parties at Kempton Park the previous night. I’ll never 
forget that press conference because as soon as F.W.de Klerk finished his 
comments with some kind words about my contribution to the just concluded 
negotiations, the first question was put to me by a white South African 
journalist who said to me, “Mr Secretary General, the State President has 
spoken about your help to our country. What about your own country?”, there 
had the same night of the conclusion of the negotiations in South Africa been 
a military coup d’etat by General Abacha in Nigeria. 
 
SO: Had you known that? 
 
EA: Yes because at about a quarter to midnight that night my Nigerian Special 
Assistant had brought to me a note in the conference hall at Kempton Park 
where we all were, saying that there had been a coup in Nigeria. I looked at 
the journalist straight in the face and said, “Well, I'm sure you would 
appreciate that it's human nature to deal with one problem at a time”. 
 
SO: Sir, you're remarkably adept at thinking on your feet! 
 
EA: I remember that F.W. de Klerk whispered to me, “You're a very experienced 
diplomat”.  
 
SO: Which is true! Sir, from what you're saying, it was the example of your 
Commonwealth team, with their various national origins but clearly 
working together. 
 
EA: Yes. 
 
SO: It's also your team: you've mentioned Stuart, you've mentioned Moses 
Anafu, who of course was intimately involved in those discussions and 
the Commonwealth observer groups going down into Kwazulu Natal at 
the time. So they had the benefit of seeing your particular negotiating 
style?  
 
EA: I believe so. 
 
SO: How did structures and techniques of negotiation transfer? Did you 
have debriefings on coming back to Marlborough House on how best to 
proceed thereafter? 
 
EA: I think that the most effective way of transferring techniques is by enabling 
colleagues to be present at the negotiations. Those who were present and 
who accompanied me to these discussions saw how I was handling the 
discussions, and I'd like to believe that they would have learnt from that. 
 
SO: This then suggests that Moses Anafu, as a Ghanaian, had that unique 
African advantage again? 
 
14 
 
EA: He too, yes, because I can recall two occasions when he did very well. One 
was in Zanzibar and the other was in Lesotho. In Zanzibar, I tried to broker 
peace between the ruling party and the opposition party, CUF, particularly 
after the elections. I left Moses behind and Moses succeeded eventually in 
getting them to agree to a memorandum that he and I had prepared. 
 
SO: Did you delegate complete autonomy to him, or was he regularly 
checking back? 
 
EA: Well, I delegated to him authority to negotiate with the parties after leaving 
behind the memorandum as the basis of his negotiations. The memorandum 
had to be modified from time to time in consultations of course with me. I then 
went back for the formal signing and celebration of the agreement by the 
parties. 
 
SO: Sir, what were the relations like between you and your supporting team 
with the South African Foreign Minister and his team? You’ve spoken 
very much of your success in reaching F.W. de Klerk and then in 
providing support for the transition negotiations; but I just wondered 
about the Department of Foreign Affairs? 
 
EA:  They played very little part in the negotiations in which I was involved. 
 
SO: Was that your conscious choice to concentrate on the head of 
government? 
 
EA: Absolutely. I knew that F.W. de Klerk was a man who was driving the change. 
I must say that my confidence in F.W. de Klerk was higher than my 
confidence in Foreign Minister Pik Botha, in terms of their capacity to effect 
the changes they were advocating. 
 
SO: Is that because of your assessment of where de Klerk came from, and 
where his constituency was? That he was coming from the right of his 
party, having been leader of the Transvaal National Party. Leaders from 
the right are often able to innovate... 
 
EA: Absolutely. 
 
SO: ... in a way that those who come from Centre Left are not. 
 
EA: Absolutely. Those from the right are usually more credible within their party. 
So, if you get a leader from the right who is persuaded about change, he or 
she is likely to effect that change much more readily than a leader from the 
left. Pik Botha was known for years as saying the right things. He was a 
liberal. He represented the liberal wing of the National Party, but at the end I 
believe that the deal had to be done not between the liberal wing of the party 
but between the right wing. F.W. de Klerk, I had seen him in ’86, when the 
Eminent Persons Group went to South Africa. He was then Minister for 
Education. De Klerk was as right wing as they came. If you had asked me 
then who were the three most right wing politicians in South Africa, I would 
have said P.W. Botha, Magnus Malan, and F.W. de Klerk. 
 
SO: Really. Not Chris Heunis? 
 
15 
 
EA: No. Chris Heunis was a liberal. Chris Heunis was just a shade above Pik 
Botha. Chris Heunis was the Minister for Constitution. Chris Heunis sounded 
reconciliatory. If you had asked me to name two or three who were in the 
Liberal wing, I would have said Pik Botha and the then Minister of Finance. 
 
SO: Barend du Plessis. 
 
EA: Yes, Du Plessis was the man who said to us that he found it difficult to have 
to build three hospitals instead of one under apartheid. 
 
SO: Because the tri-cameral parliamentary arrangements required separate 
racial facilities? 
 
EA: Yes, a hospital for the whites, a hospital for the coloureds and a hospital for 
the Indians. Of course the Africans were never mentioned; I would have 
classified him as belonging to the liberal wing of his party just like Chris 
Heunis. 
 
SO: Sir, did you use the same political reading of the situation when you 
talked to Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya? Calculating that there were 
elements within KANU that he could direct and control to lead to multi-
party elections, whereas somebody who was, say, from a more liberal 
technocratic wing of the party could not deliver change? In other words, 
as in Soviet Russia under Gorbachev, because of the structure of the 
system, change had to come from the top? 
 
EA: Every situation was different. In the case of Kenya and Arap Moi, after several 
conversations with him, I persuaded him to accept that I would send a 
constitutional expert to come and help Kenya revise their constitution, to 
adapt it to the requirements of a multi-party state. 
 
SO: Did you select an African? 
 
EA: Yes I selected Professor Ben Mwabueze from Nigeria, a widely 
acknowledged constitutional expert. Ben Nwabueze knows the constitutions 
of most African countries and has written profusely about them. He is a great 
intellectual constitutional lawyer and a highly respected authority. I sent him to 
Kenya and he helped them to revise their constitution to serve the needs of a 
multi-party state. Then after that, when they held their elections, as I narrated 
in my memoirs, I had to fly there to deal with the resultant crisis. 
 
The crisis involved Ken Matiba, Mwai Kibaki and Odinga Oginga. Mwai Kibaki 
had led a break away party and had won about 646,000 votes; Odinga 
Oginga about 910,000 votes and Ken Matiba about 1.4 million votes as 
against Moi’s approximately 1.9 million votes. The three claimed that Moi, 
having won far less votes than their combined votes, had no legitimacy. 
I held meetings with them stressing to them the implications of their having 
fought the elections as different political parties. I reminded them that in the 
recent elections in the United States of America, the votes of the Republican 
party and Ross Perot who ran as an independent, taken together were higher 
than the votes for the Democratic party whose candidate became the 
President. 
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SO: But there you're suggesting a process whereby people buy into 
elections because each believe they can win, but then that turns into 
‘elections they must win’? 
 
EA: Yes, I was saying to them that Moi having scored the highest votes as 
provided in their constitution had to be declared the winner but that I would 
endeavour to persuade Moi to agree to an arrangement that would allow 
greater accountability and avoid the “winner take all” syndrome. They agreed 
and that was how the crisis was resolved. 
 
SO: Was this your personal hard-fought diplomacy, or is this again 
delegating to a particular team? 
 
EA: No. I handled this myself by holding the meetings with Ken Matiba, Odinga 
Oginga and Mwai Kibaki; it was not a situation that I could delegate to 
colleagues in the Secretariat. 
 
SO: So this is one on one diplomacy? 
 
EA: It was first “one-on-three” diplomacy, because I met these three leaders 
together, and one-on-one with Moi accompanied in both cases by one 
assistant. 
 
SO: Sir, may I suggest that in addition to being empathetic, gaining trust, 
drawing upon African networks and skills, you also had to have a 
remarkable amount of personal stamina? 
 
EA: I don't know about that. [Laughter] 
 
SO: Thinking of the time investment, and patience. 
 
EA: Yes, time and patience. And this experience was not limited to Africa. I 
remember that my intervention in Bangladesh also demanded a lot of time 
and patience. When I went there, you know, the two political leaders were 
women: Begum Zia and Sheikh Hasina. Begum Zia was the Prime Minister; 
she had become Prime Minister following the assassination of her husband 
who had been the Prime Minister. 
 
My first meeting with the leader of the opposition party, Sheikh Hasina, was 
held in her sitting room. She and I were sitting under the portrait of her father, 
Sheik Abdul Rahman, the first Prime Minister of independent Bangladesh who 
with his entire family had been killed in a military coup d’etat. She was lucky 
to be out of the country on that fateful night. That was how she was spared. 
She was full of emotion, looking as we talked, at the photographs of all her 
family, uncles and siblings, all of whom were eliminated with her father. I was 
personally quite moved by her emotion. I believe that she recognised from my 
voice that I was very moved, especially when I then said to her, “Sheikh 
Hasina, even if a thousand people who were responsible for this atrocious 
tragedy were to be tried and executed, that surely cannot bring him and your 
other family victims back”. I looked at her straight in the eye and said, “Is it not 
better to think of how to get this country to a situation where such tragedy 
should never, never again happen? I have come here to help in dealing with 
the seemingly endless feud between you and Begum Zia which has brought 
continuing violent protests in your country”. 
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I then put forward a proposal that I would want to send a trusted, experienced 
representative to come to Bangladesh to hold discussions with her and Prime 
Minister Begum Zia with a view to finding a formula for mutual 
accommodation between their two parties. She accepted my proposal and so 
did PM Begum Zia with whom I had two meetings. Consequently, I sent as 
my representative, Sir Ninian Stephen, an Australian retired judge who spent 
weeks in Dhaka brokering peace between the government and the opposition 
parties. 
 
SO: Sir, in addition to presenting the awful logic that her family could not be 
brought back but that she should be encouraged to move forward to 
make sure that there was never again a repetition of that violence, did 
you draw upon the historic contribution of the Commonwealth to the 
recognition of Bangladesh back in 1971, to say ‘We are established 
friends of Bangladesh’? 
 
EA: Yes, I told her the story of how I was directly involved in getting African 
recognition for Bangladesh and of my meeting with her father at the CHOGM 
in 1973 in Ottawa at which I was the Conference Secretary. This of course 
had helped in establishing a personal rapport between us. 
 
SO: Yes, because that international diplomatic recognition of Bangladesh 
independence was enormously contentious for Nigeria. 
 
EA: Yes it was. 
 
SO: For Bangladesh, in ’71. You had contacted Tanzania and …? 
   
EA: Arnold Smith had sent me on a mission to West Africa – Gambia, Sierra 
Leone, Ghana and Nigeria – and I deliberately went to Nigeria last. I wanted 
to be sure that I got the others and particularly Sierra Leone and Ghana to 
agree before going to Nigeria. My visit to Ghana was within the first couple of 
days of the Acheampong coup. As I told the story in my memoirs, faced by 
two well armed soldiers standing behind General Acheampong opposite 
whom I sat in his office during our meeting, I was scared of reaching out for 
my scribbling pad in the inside pocket of my jacket. 
 
SO: In case they thought you were reaching for a weapon? 
 
EA: Yes. That's right. Because the two soldiers behind him had their guns pointed 
in my direction. The Foreign Minister and the Cabinet Secretary were present 
at the meeting. I was happy when at the end of our meeting, Acheampong 
agreed to Bangladesh joining the Commonwealth which was the most formal 
way to recognise the new country. The difficult one was Nigeria but 
fortunately I was able to persuade General Gowon, the Head of State, that 
Nigeria should not oppose the admission of Bangladesh into the 
Commonwealth. 
 
SO: Was it because you persuaded them of the logic that they shouldn’t 
oppose it? 
 
EA: Yes. The difficulty in Nigeria was because the day before I got to Lagos, 
some local newspapers had carried the headline “NO TRUCK WITH 
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SECESSION”. They viewed the emergence of Bangladesh as secession from 
the established state of Pakistan. Having fought a civil war to prevent the 
secession of Biafra from Nigeria, the newspapers sought to discourage the 
Government from recognising Bangladesh. 
 
SO: Sir, what you're suggesting here then is that as Commonwealth 
Secretary General- and your position as a proactive, international civil 
servant who then became a political actor - and I'm using the word 
“political” in inverted commas – you built upon your enormous 
institutional knowledge and your personal engagement at critical points 
in the Secretariat’s history?  
 
EA: I think that's a fair way of putting it. But I would still be reluctant to use the 
word “civil servant” because the debate from the beginning of the Secretariat 
was whether the Secretariat would be just a civil service, or a proactive and 
active institution of the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: Given your extraordinary longevity of service to the Commonwealth - as 
you said when we started talking it was 34 years - do you feel then that 
longevity of other officers was a benefit throughout that time? I know 
the pattern of appointment for three consecutive terms then was revised 
and revisited. But with that comes an institutional leaching, a depletion 
of people’s personal experience and knowledge. So, organisations 
change over time. The Secretariat you joined in 1966, at the beginning, 
was a very different beast to the Secretariat that you left in 2000. 
 
EA: That's right. Well, I saw and was involved in the process of change in the 
Secretariat, particularly when I became the Secretary General. But I think the 
advantage I had was that having witnessed it all, having been part of the 
process I could draw on that experience in my activities and in my 
relationships with heads of government. Intervening to help resolve what I 
described as “inter-mestic” issues in several Commonwealth countries was a 
constant feature of my tenure as Secretary-General. I did not write in my 
memoirs about all the interventions in which I was involved, for example, I 
said nothing about my intervention in Pakistan during a potentially 
destabilizing disagreement between the President and the Prime Minister. 
 
SO: No.  I was struck by that gap.  
 
EA: I was involved in what amounted to preventing a potential military coup at the 
time in Pakistan. 
 
SO: In what way, Sir? 
 
EA: There was a major crisis between the Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif and the 
President, Farooq Leghari at the time. The President had the sympathy of the 
judiciary; the Prime Minister had the strong support of the Parliament and 
government, while the military were expressing some disquiet. I went to 
Pakistan and had long conversations with the Prime Minister and the 
President, impressing on them the need for accommodation and perhaps 
calling early elections which they both accepted. 
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SO: But, Sir, how were you alerted that the political situation in Pakistan was 
becoming so tense that it was highly likely there would be military 
intervention? 
 
EA: I reached that conclusion from my discussions with my contacts here in 
London including the High Commissioner. 
 
SO: So, again it's the question of personal networks. It strikes me that this is 
where the Commonwealth has really its ace, in its personal networks. 
 
EA: Yes. My last observation is that the strength of the Commonwealth in terms of 
its capacity for diplomatic work lies in its formal and informal, personal 
relationships. The Commonwealth unlike any other comparable international 
organisations is not just an association of governments. It is also an 
association of peoples, and professional groups. The contacts that are 
generated through these associations underpin the work that goes on at the 
governmental level. 
 
SO: So, this global sub-system in a way is working against the current drive 
for technology, for substitution of human contact. You're emphasising 
the enduring value in fact... 
 
EA: Of human contact. Yes. 
 
SO: I think, Si, I should end it there. Thank you very, very much indeed. 
 
[END OF AUDIOFILE] 
